Margaret Lucille Lent v. Norman Floyd Lent : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1998
Margaret Lucille Lent v. Norman Floyd Lent : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
G. Michael Westfall; Gallian, Westfall, Wilcox & Wright; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant.
LaMar J Winward; Attorney for Defendant/Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Lent v. Lent, No. 981568 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1802
w i M H COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. tfflZZT 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARGARET LUCILLE LENT, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
NORMAN FLOYD LENT, 
Defendant/ Appellee. 
Appellate No. 981568-CA 
Argument Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Order of Dismissal of the 
District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District, the Honorable James L. Shumate, 
Presiding. 
LaMar J. Winward (Bar No. 3528) 
150 North 200 East, #204 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
G. Michael Westfall (Bar No. 3434) 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX 
& WRIGHT 
59 South 100 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
FILED 
MAR 0 & 1999 
COURT OF APPEALS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Nature of the Case 2 
Statement of Facts 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 7 
A. DEFENDANT RESIDED IN THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP IN THIS 
STATE 7 
B. THE ACTS GIVING RISE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OCCURRED IN 
THIS STATE 10 
1. Marital Infidelity 10 
2. Alcohol Use 11 
CONCLUSION 12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 14 
ADDENDUM 15 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
Snelling v. Gardner, 590 N.E. 2d 330 (Ohio App. 1990) 9,10 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-24(6) 6,11 
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES 
25 Am Jur 2d Domicil §4 8 
25 Am Jur 2d Domicil §6 9 
ii 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3(h), Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Did Defendant reside, in the marital relationship, within this state, for purposes of in 
personam jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding, where he lived and worked in this state during the 
marriage but maintained his permanent domicile in another state? 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Did the Trial Court err by ruling that Utah does not have jurisdiction over Defendant 
where acts that created the irreconcilable differences that exist between the parties, and which 
were relied on in granting the Decree of Divorce, occurred in the State of Utah. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of this appeal is de novo because the issue of jurisdiction is one of 
law. See Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644, 646-47 (Utah App. 1995); Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 
157, 160 (Utah Ap. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(6) (1998) 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a citizen or resident of 
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, 
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising out of or related to . . . 
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(6) With respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support, having 
resided, in the marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure 
from the state; or the commission in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long 
as that act is not a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendant 
had no control. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce in this matter on May 14, 1997, seeking a 
divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Jurisdiction on or about September 10, 1997, claiming that he had not resided in Utah 
with the Plaintiff during their marriage. 
In response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had 
lived in Utah on several occasions during the marriage while he worked on projects in this state. 
Plaintiff alleged that one of the differences between the parties that resulted in the action for 
divorce was Defendant's marital infidelity which occurred in Utah while he was working and 
living in this state. Plaintiff also claimed that Defendant had stayed at her residence in Utah on 
several occasions since she moved here in 1992, but she acknowledged they had not shared the 
same bed during those stays. 
At a hearing held on November 10, 1997, the Trial Court denied the Motion to 
Dismiss. 
As he was permitted to do, Defendant renewed his Motion to Dismiss on June 16, 
1998, this time supported by his Affidavit, claiming that he had not engaged in any extra-marital 
relationship within the State of Utah. 
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Plaintiff responded to this Second Motion to Dismiss by acknowledging that she could 
not prove that Defendant's acts of infidelity occurred within the borders of the State of Utah, but 
maintained that he was living in Utah when the infidelity occurred. 
At the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which was combined with a hearing 
on Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate, Plaintiff testified that grounds for the divorce included 
irreconcilable differences arising out of Defendant's excessive use of alcohol and that he had 
committed those acts in Utah. The Court granted the Motion to Bifurcate, finding that it had 
jurisdiction over the marriage, but also granted the Motion to Dismiss, ruling that Defendant did 
not have sufficient contacts with Utah for the Court to determine any issues other than 
dissolution of the marriage. This appeal followed that Order of Dismissal. 
2. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on March 27, 1954, in Riverside, Bingham 
County Idaho. (See Affidavit of Margaret Lucille Lent, filed September 29, 1997) (R. at 26) 
During the parties' marriage the Defendant worked in the State of Utah on several 
occasions and, in several instances, for extended periods of time. (R. at 26-27) 
The Defendant worked at a power plant in Castle Gate, Utah, from April of 1957 until 
some time during the month of July of 1957. Defendant lived in Utah that entire time. 
(R. at 27) Defendant brought the parties' children and Plaintiff to stay with him for about two 
weeks while he worked there. Plaintiff and Defendant stayed at a motel in, Helper, or one of the 
surrounding communities. (R. at 27) 
In 1960, from March through July, the Defendant was working on a project at Geneva 
Steel in Utah County, Utah. He lived in Utah that entire time. The parties' children and Plaintiff 
accompanied the Defendant to the area where he worked. The Plaintiff and Defendant stayed at 
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a red brick colored complex where some of Defendant's associates were also living for the length 
of the project. Plaintiff believes the complex was on Main Street in Pleasant Grove, Utah 
County, Utah. The Plaintiff and Defendant resided together at that time for approximately two 
weeks. (R. at 27) 
From April of 1961 until sometime in August of 1961 the Defendant worked on the 
construction of the Flaming Gorge Dam near Dutch John, Utah. During that time Defendant 
came to Pocatello to get Plaintiff and Defendant and Plaintiff traveled to the place he was living 
at in the Dutch John/ Manilla area of Utah ( about 35 miles from Vernal). Plaintiff and 
Defendant and their children lived in a mobile unit designed like a complex with another couple 
occupying the other half while Defendant worked there. Plaintiff was there with him for 
approximately two weeks. (R. at 27) 
On the instances that Plaintiff recalls when the Defendant was working in Utah and 
Plaintiff resided with him, the Defendant and Plaintiff clearly did so as husband and wife so that 
they could be together while Defendant worked in the State of Utah. They shared the same bed 
and Plaintiff maintained the home. (R. at 27-28) 
In 1976, from March 10 until June 16, Defendant lived in Utah and worked on the Carbon 
Power Plant near Castlegate, Utah. (R. at 28) 
There are numerous other instances when Defendant has lived and worked in Utah for 
shorter periods of time. (R. at 28) 
One of the irreconcilable differences that developed during Plaintiff and the Defendant's 
marriage arose out of Defendant's marital infidelity. That marital infidelity occurred while the 
Defendant was working in the State of Utah. (R. at 28) 
Defendant denies having engaged in any extra marital relationship within the State of 
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Utah. (R. at 74-75) 
There was a four to five week period of time in approximately 1992, while Plaintiff was 
attending school in Provo, Utah, that the Defendant stayed at her apartment. Plaintiff and 
Defendant slept separately on that occasion because the sleeping facilities were limited to one 
small single bed. (R. at 28) 
The Defendant and Plaintiff resided together at Plaintiffs residence in Provo while 
Defendant was working on a job on the boiler at the Brigham Young University campus in 1992 
or 1993. Plaintiff and Defendant didn't share a bed on that occasion but Plaintiff fixed 
Defendant's lunch and other meals and did Defendant's laundry. (R. at 28) 
There was an additional week when the Defendant came and resided with Plaintiff in 
Provo to repair Plaintiffs car. (R. at 28-29) 
On another occasion, sometime in 1992 or 1993, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff on his 
way to a job at Delta, Utah. On that occasion Defendant became ill and was hospitalized in Delta 
with severe back pain. When Defendant was well enough to drive he came back to Provo to stay 
at Plaintiffs apartment. Defendant ultimately did return to Pocatello on that occasion. (R. at 
29) 
While Plaintiff was in Provo the Defendant spent Thanksgiving and Christmas with 
Plaintiff there. On one occasion Plaintiff and Defendant had Thanksgiving dinner with a family 
at the Excelsior Hotel and Defendant helped with gift wrapping and Christmas lights. (R. at 29) 
Because of tax advantages the Defendant and Plaintiff had declared Idaho as their 
permanent residence. As Plaintiff understood it the Defendant was able to deduct rent and 
expenses in other states if they did so. However, there have been numerous instances during the 
parties' marriage, as indicated above, when the Plaintiff claims that Defendant has resided in the 
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State of Utah while working and, on occasion, Plaintiff has joined him here. (R. at 29) 
Although Defendant does not deny Plaintiffs allegations concerning his work history and 
where he lived while working in Utah, he did sign an affidavit in which he claimed that he had 
"never been a resident of the State of Utah." (R. at 74) 
Although the Plaintiff cannot prove that the Defendant's act of sexual intercourse with 
another woman occurred within the boundaries of the State of Utah, the Defendant has engaged 
in acts of sexual intercourse while he was living and working in the State of Utah. The Plaintiff 
confronted the Defendant about whether he had had sexual intercourse with another woman 
during one of the times he lived in Utah and he did not deny that he had sex with another woman. 
In fact, his response was, "Everybody has slept with her, including Butch." (R. at 73) 
The Plaintiff has seen a Utah birth certificate for a child born approximately 35 years ago 
and Defendant was listed as the father on that birth certificate. Plaintiff has attempted to locate a 
copy of that birth certificate and has been unable to do so. (R. at 72) 
Although the Defendant and Plaintiff do have assets in the State of Idaho, the Defendant 
is a member of the Boilermakers Local Union No. 182 in Salt Lake City, Utah. This is the 
source of Defendant's retirement plan. (R. at 29-30) 
At trial the Plaintiff testified that, since 1995, the Defendant had spent time in her home, 
including staying overnight in her home although the parties have not shared the same bedroom. 
She also testified that one of the irreconcilable differences that arose between the parties during 
their marriage was the Defendant's consumption of alcohol in the State of Utah. (R. at 106 page 
13-17) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Although the Defendant did not officially change his domicile, he did reside in the 
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marital relationship within the state as required by UCA §78-27-24(6) in the following 
particulars: 
(1) He resided in the State of Utah while the parties were married and he worked 
in the State of Utah; 
(2) He resided with the Plaintiff for brief periods of time while she lived in the 
State of Utah since 1995. 
The irreconcilable differences that exist between the parties and resulted in the entry of a 
Decree of Divorce included not only infidelity, which the Plaintiff is unable to prove actually 
occurred within the boundaries of the State of Utah, but the Defendant's use and abuse of 
alcohol, which Plaintiff did testify at trial occurred within the State of Utah as recently as since 
1995. Therefore, Plaintiff maintains that at least some of the "acts" giving rise to the Plaintiffs 
claim of irreconcilable differences arising out of Defendant's alcohol use were committed in this 
state. 
Since the Defendant did reside in the marital relationship within this state and acts giving 
rise to the Plaintiffs claim for divorce based on irreconcilable differences were also committed 
in this state, the Trial Court had jurisdiction over Defendant and should not have dismissed the 
Plaintiffs Complaint for want of in personam jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-24(6) provides as follows: 
"Any person . . . who . . .does any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself,. . . 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: (6)with respect 
to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child support, having resided, in the 
marital relationship, within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from the 
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state; or the commission in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act 
is not a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the Respondent had no 
control; . . ." 
If the Defendant "resided, in the marital relationship, within this state" or if Defendant 
committed any act in this state giving rise to Plaintiffs claim, then this Court has jurisdiction 
over the Defendant. 
A. DEFENDANT RESIDED IN THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP IN THIS 
STATE. 
Plaintiff does not maintain that the Defendant was an "actual and bonafide resident" of 
this state, as would be required under UCA §30-3-l(2)if Plaintiff were seeking to have this Court 
exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case based on Defendant's "actual and 
bonafide" residency. There is clearly a difference between actual and bonafide residence of the 
county in which the proceeding is commenced in order to confer subject matter jurisdiction and 
"residence in the marital relationship" in order to confer jurisdiction over a party. The Fifth 
District Court has jurisdiction over the Defendant because he resided in this state while working 
here for periods of time during the parties' marriage. He did so on several occasions during the 
parties' marriage in conjunction with his employment and while the Plaintiff was attending 
school in Utah County. 
The terms "resided" and "marital relationship" will be considered separately in analyzing 
whether Defendant's conduct satisfies the minimal contacts required for in personam jurisdiction 
in a divorce proceeding. 
The term "marital relationship" means nothing more than that the parties are married i.e., 
had the relationship of husband and wife, at the time the event occurred. In essence, this means 
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that if a party resided in the State of Utah prior to being married and never resided in the State of 
Utah while the parties' were married this Court would not have jurisdiction over that party since 
the residence in the State of Utah had not occurred during the marital relationship i.e. while the 
parties' were married. 
In this instance, the acts which the Plaintiff claims give rise to this Court's exercise of 
jurisdiction over the Defendant, including Defendant's residence in this state, did occur while the 
parties' were married i.e. during the marital relationship. 
The next key term that needs to be considered is the term "reside." 
Had the Utah State legislature intended that a party have been an "actual and bonafide 
resident" of the State of Utah during the marital relationship in order for this Court to assert 
jurisdiction the legislature clearly could have done so. However, the legislature, instead, chose to 
grant jurisdiction over a party if he had resided, during the marriage, in this State. The 
distinction between "actual and bonafide resident, " required under UCA §30-3-1 to confer 
subject matter jurisdiction and "residing" in the state for a period of time in order to confer in 
personam jurisdiction is not insignificant. 
There is a distinction between "actual and bonafide residence" and residence in the state. 
In 25 Am Jur 2d Domicile §4 the commentator notes that: 
"'Residence' may mean a temporary, permanent, or transient character; or it may means 
one's fixed abode, depending on the particular object of it's use. In determining it's 
meaning as it is used in particular pieces of legislation, it's context within the statute and 
the legislative purpose are examined. Thus, in some instances, residence requires mere 
physical presence, while in others something more than physical presence is required and 
the element of intent becomes material, even where "residence" is not deemed to be the 
equivalent of a "domicile." 
In 25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 6 the commentator notes as follows: 
"A distinction between "legal residence" and "actual residence" has been recognized. 
9 
"Actual residence" has connotations of a more temporary character, while the phrase "legal 
residence" is sometimes used as the equivalent of domicile." 
The term "actual and bonafide resident" is more akin to the "legal residence" referred to 
in Am Jur 2d Domicile. On the other hand, the legislature's use of the term "resident," without 
any limitations, is more like the term "actual residence" as used in the Am Jur 2d Domicile 
article. The legislature quite clearly intended that a party reside in the State of Utah during the 
marriage, i.e., live in this state, not that he have attained the status of "legal residence" in order 
to confer in personam jurisdiction. 
In Smiling v. Gardner, 590 N.E. P.2d 330 (Ohio App. 1990) the Ohio Court of Appeals 
noted, in reversing a trial court's failure to assume in personam jurisdiction under URESA that 
"The trial court, however, appears to have grounded its decision upon an assumption that 
respondent's residence is equivalent to respondent's domicile. Although the terms 
"residence" and "domicile" are frequently used interchangeably, they in fact are distinctly 
different, albeit related, concepts, [citations omitted] 'Domicile' has most often been defined 
as a legal relationship between a person and a particular place which contemplates two 
factors: first, residence, at least for some period of time and, second, the intent to reside in 
that place permanently or at least indefinitely, [citations omitted] 
Thus, 'residence' is encompassed within the definition of 'domicile.' An important 
distinction, however, lies in the fact that, while a person can only have one domicile, he 
generally may have more than one residence." [citations omitted] Id at 332-333. 
In Snelling the trial court concluded that, while the State of Ohio was not the 
respondent's domicile he was capable of having multiple residence and that he had resided in the 
State of Ohio. 
Plaintiff does not claim that the Defendant was domiciled in the State of Utah. However, 
just as the respondent in Snelling resided in the State of Ohio, the Defendant in this proceeding 
resided in the State of Utah in the marital relationship. 
The Utah State Legislature clearly intended that the Defendant in a divorce proceeding 
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have some contact with this state more than just passing through the state or staying overnight on 
vacation. However, to live or reside in the state while working here for weeks at a time, even if a 
party retained his legal domicile in another state, would satisfy that requirement. 
In this case the Defendant resided in the State of Utah for periods of time during the 
parties' marriage while he worked on various projects in conjunction with his full-time 
employment. Joint residency in this state does not appear to be required by the statute i.e. the 
statute does not appear to require that the parties have slept in the same bed in this state. 
However, on occasion when the Plaintiff did come and reside with the Defendant in this state the 
Plaintiff and Defendant did share the same bed and maintain a marital household. 
The Defendant clearly had the benefits of the laws of the State of Utah while he resided 
in this state in conjunction with his employment. Although he may never have acquired the 
status of legal domicile, his actual residence in this state is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over 
him in this divorce proceeding. 
B. THE ACTS GIVING RISE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OCCURRED IN 
THIS STATE. 
1. Marital Infidelity 
Plaintiff claims that the irreconcilable differences that exist arose out of, among other 
things, Defendant's marital infidelity and alcohol abuse. Plaintiff could not prove that the 
Defendant committed sexual intercourse within the boundaries of the State of Utah. However his 
instances of infidelity did occur while he was working in the State of Utah and, therefore, the 
irreconcilable differences arose while he was in this state, even if the actual acts of sexual 
intercourse were consummated in a neighboring state. Therefore, although Plaintiff might not be 
able to prove that the Defendant engaged in sexual intercourse within the boundaries of the State 
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of Utah, if the infidelity occurred during a period of time that Defendant was residing in the State 
of Utah, working on projects in this State, and the grounds for divorce are irreconcilable 
differences, arising out of, among other things, the Defendant's marital infidelity, a trial court in 
Utah should assert jurisdiction based on UCA §78-27-24(6). That statute should not be restricted 
so as to protect a person from the jurisdiction of a court of this state where the party is residing in 
the State of Utah at the time the marital infidelity occurred but steps across the state line, if that 
is the case, in order to consummate a specific act of infidelity. 
2. ALCOHOL USE 
UCA §78-27-24(6) "indicates that this court has jurisdiction over a person who 
commits in this state . . .the act giving rise to the claim,. . ." In this instance as in many divorces 
it is impossible to isolate one specific act that created the irreconcilable differences. There are 
typically numerous acts that eventually result in a conclusion that the differences between the 
parties are irreconcilable. In this instance, the Defendant's use and abuse of alcohol is an act, or 
acts, that occurred on numerous occasions but also which occurred in the State of Utah. 
The evidence before the Court in this instance established that the Defendant had 
committed the act of alcohol use and that this act, or these acts, created one of the irreconcilable 
differences which resulted in this divorce. Defendant had committed that act, or acts, in the State 
of Utah. Since that act, the use of alcohol, occurred within this state and that is the act or, at 
least, one of the acts giving rise to the Plaintiffs claim for irreconcilable differences, and the 
trial court granted the Plaintiff a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the trial 
court had jurisdiction over the Defendant and should have heard the remainder of the pending 
case. 
Since the act or acts which resulted in irreconcilable differences were committed by the 
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Defendant within the State of Utah, the trial court erred when it dismissed the Plaintiffs 
Complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Defendant did not officially change his domicile or full-time residence, the 
Defendant did reside in marital relationship within the State of Utah. He worked for extensive 
periods of time in the State of Utah while maintaining a domicile in the State of Idaho. He 
resided in Utah during those periods of time. The Defendant also resided with the Plaintiff for 
brief of periods of time since 1995 while she was living in Provo, Utah and attending school. 
The trial court had jurisdiction over the Defendant based on his having resided in the marital 
relationship in the State of Utah. 
The irreconcilable differences that arose between the parties arose because of acts 
committed by the Defendant while he was residing in the State of Utah. Although the Plaintiff 
could not prove to the trial court that the sexual act that evidenced the Defendant's marital 
infidelity occurred within the boundaries of the state, she did present testimony which was 
accepted by the trial court that the act of alcohol use and abuse occurred within the boundaries of 
the State of Utah and that the alcohol use and abuse was an irreconcilable difference that resulted 
in the Plaintiffs seeking a Decree of Divorce. 
The trial court had jurisdiction over the Defendant both because the Defendant had 
resided in the marital relationship within the State of Utah and because the Defendant had 
committed acts in the State of Utah giving rise to the Plaintiffs claim for a divorce based on 
irreconcilable differences and, therefore, the trial court should not have dismissed the Plaintiffs 
Complaint. The trial court's Order dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint should be set aside and 
the Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed to a trial on the merits in the State of Utah to resolve 
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the remaining issues between the parties. 
DATED this ^ T d a y of _ 1999. 
t 
G. Michael Westfall 
of and for 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
I, G. Michael Westfall, certify that on March 3,1999,1 served two copies of the attached 
Brief of Appellant upon LaMar J. Winward, the counsel for the Appellee in this matter, by 
mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
LaMar J. Winward 
150 North 200 East, #204 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
(ST GEORGE DEPARTMENT) 
MARGARET LUCILLE LENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
NORMAN FLOYD LENT, 
Defendant. 
DIVORCE HEARING 
Case No. 97450000368 DA 
Hon. JAMES L. SHUMATE 
APPEAL #981568 
ORIGINAL 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of July, 
1998 this matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the above-named court. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and 
represented by counsel, the following proceedings 
were held: 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE P L A I N T I F F : 
02 1998 
S T . GEORGE, UT 84 7 7 0 Julia D'Alesand 
c
' e * of the Court 
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL, ESQ.NOV 
59 SOUTH 100 EAST 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
LAMAR J. WINWARD, ESQ 
150 NORTH 200 EAST #204 
ST GEORGE UT 84770 
%StS-C4 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - LIC. 2 2-102811-7801 
10445 SOUTH 600 EAST, SALEM, UT 84653 
PHONE: 423-1009 
fah\pm\ IIW\ I 
1 any difficulty in allowing Ms. Lent to testify 
2 right now as to grounds and jurisdiction and 
3 granting her her divorce? 
4 MR. WINWARD: I would suggest that that 
5 happen immediately and then following the entry of 
6 the decree, the balance of the issues be dismissed 
7 pursuant to Court's order. 
8 THE JUDGE: And then once she is divorced 
9 then she can go to Idaho as a separate party and 
10 sue for the dissolution of the marital assets at 
11 that point. It's a peculiar situation. She 
12 can't ask for divorce up there but I'll bet she 
13 could ask for the property interests. 
14 MR. WESTFALL: May I have my client sworn 
15 then and testify to that issue? 
16 THE JUDGE: Mrs. Lent, would you please 
17 face the clerk, raise your right hand and be 
18 sworn? 
19 WHEREUPON, 
2 0 MARGARET LUCILE LENT 
21 having been placed under oath by the clerk of the 
22 court and sworn to testify truthfully in this 
23 matter, upon examination testified as follows: 
24 THE JUDGE: Ma'am, I'm not going to make 
25 you come up to the witness stand but you can have a 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
II PAGE 12 
MflfMllM if 
1 seat right there if you would. 
2 EXAMINATION BY THE JUDGE. 
3 THE JUDGE: Would you please state your 
4 full name? 
5 A. Margaret Lucile Lent. 
6 THE JUDGE: Mrs. Lent, you have been an 
7 actual and bona fide resident of Washington County, 
8 State of Utah for at least three months before May 
9 14th of 1997. Is that correct? 
10 A. That's correct. 
11 THE JUDGE: All right. Now Mrs. Lent, 
12 you were married to Mr. Norman Floyd Lent on March 
13 27th of 1954 in Bingham County, Idaho. Is that 
14 correct? 
15 A. That's correct. 
16 THE JUDGE: And since that time you have 
17 remained in the relationship of husband and wife. 
18 Is that correct? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 THE JUDGE: During the term of your 
21 marriage Mr. Lent has behaved in a fashion making 
22 it impossible for the marriage relationship to 
23 continue having carried on the abuse of alcohol 
24 such that you simply cannot remain married to him, 
25 II as well as the other problems that you have had 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
PAGE 1 3 
XlLJIim iff 
1 with he and other women. Is that correct? 
2 A. That's correct. 
3 THE JUDGE: All right. The Court finds 
4 that there is jurisdiction to grant a decree of 
5 divorce to Margaret Lucile Lent from Norman Floyd 
6 Lent. Adequate jurisdiction has been laid and 
7 grounds are laid. The decree of divorce shall 
8 become final and effective immediately upon signing 
9 and placing in the file. 
10 Mrs. Lent, I understand that it looks very 
11 peculiar to you that you can get divorced here but 
12 you can't get an order that takes any effect 
13 there. But I wish you the very best in getting 
14 this completely finished out. 
15 MR. WESTFALL: There are a couple of 
16 questions I would like to ask if the Court would 
17 allow. 
18 THE JUDGE: Certainly, Counsel. 
19 EXAMINATION BY MR. WESTFALL 
20 MR. WESTFALL: Mrs. Lent, during the 
21 period of time that-- How long have you lived in 
22 the State of Utah? 
23 [J A. Since July 1st, 1950. Or excuse me, 1995. 
Q. And during the period of time that you 24 
25 [I have lived in the State of Utah has the defendant, 
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1 Norman Floyd Lent, have you seen him in the State 
2 of Utah? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Approximately how many occasions has he 
5 been in the State of Utah? 
6 A. Can I back up and say that I also lived in 
7 the State of Utah from 1989 to 1993. And in that 
8 period of time I've seen him probably 10 times. 
9 Q. Okay. And since 1995 have you seen him--
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. -- in the State of Utah? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Has, during either of those periods of 
14 time has he spent any time in your home? 
15 A. Yes, he has. 
16 Q. Has he stayed overnight in your home? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Have you shared-- You haven't, you 
19 haven't shared the same bedroom though? 
20 A. That's right. 
21 Q. He has slept on the couch or somewhere 
22 else in the home. Is that correct? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. You've indicated that one of the 
25 II irreconcilable differences that arose during your 
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1 marriage was Mr. Lent's consumption of alcohol. Is 
2 that correct? 
3 A. That's correct. 
4 Q. And in that context or with regard to the 
5 consumption of alcohol have there been instances 
6 when he has visited you in the State and he has 
7 consumed alcohol? 
8 MR. WINWARD: Your Honor, I'm going to 
9 object because this has never been made a part of 
10 the pleadings and for the first time is raised 
11 today. And the divorce has already been granted. 
12 THE JUDGE: I understand your argument, 
13 Counsel. But I am going to allow Mr. Westfall to 
14 preserve his record. 
15 MR, WESTFALL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
16 THE JUDGE: Go ahead, Counsel. 
17 MR. WESTFALL: Thank you. Have there 
18 been instances when, during the times that Mr. Lent 
19 has visited you in the State of Utah that he has 
20 consumed alcohol in the State of Utah? 
21 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
22 MR. WESTFALL: And did his consumption of 
23 alcohol in the State of Utah on any of those 
24 occasions contribute toward your irreconcilable 
25 differences that leads you to believe that this 
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1 marriage needs to be terminated? 
2 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
3 MR. WESTFALL: That's all I have. 
4 THE JUDGE: All right. Mrs. Lent, I 
5 hope I've been able to do some good for you 
6 today. Good luck to you, ma'am. 
7 MR. WINWARD: And Your Honor, I would 
8 just lay this record because this issue, it's the 
9 first time it has been raised I have not had an 
10 opportunity to discuss alcohol consumption with 
11 Mr. Lent. He is not here for this hearing to 
12 defend himself on that point. 
13 THE JUDGE: You have your record. 
14 Counsel. All right. 
15 WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
PAGE 17 
AiLdi/</h \/n 
FILED 
" " " 'CT C0UR1 
' S 3 RUG 3 fin 11 l ! l 
C-JNTY 
LaMAR J WESTWARD - A3528 BY . _ j£ 
Attorney for Respondent 
150 North 200 East, Suite 204 
St. George, UT 84770 
Telephone: (435) 628-1191 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET LUCELE LENT, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
NORMAN FLOYD LENT, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
) Civil No. 974500368 
) Judge James L. Shumate 
Respondents motion to dismiss came on for hearing on July 17, 
1998, before the Honorable James L. Shumate, District Court Judge. 
Petitioner was present personally and represented by counsel, G. 
Michael Westfall. Respondent was represented by counsel, LaMar J 
Winward. The Court having reviewed the file, the affidavits of the 
parties, having heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully 
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
respondent's motion should be granted as to all issues except for the 
issue of divorcing the parties themselves. Therefore, the petitioner's 
1 
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complaint, except as to the issue of divorce itself, is hereby 
dismissed. 
DATED this 
c^ 
Oames L. Shumate 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and exact UN-signed copy 
of the above and foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL, postage prepaid, on 
this _Z^_ day of July, 1998, to: 
Mr. G. Michael Westfall 
59 South 100 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
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GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
G. MICHAEL WESTFALL #3434 ''T ' 
59 South 100 East 
St. George, UT 84770 M —~~ 
(435)628-1682 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARGARET LUCILE LENT, ] 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
NORMAN FLOYD LENT, 
Defendant 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN RE: 
) BIFURCATED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) Civil No. 974500368 
) Judge James L. Shumate 
The above entitled matter came before the Court for hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to 
Bifurcate on Friday, July 17, 1998. Plaintiff was present in person and represented by her counsel 
of record, G. Michael Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT. 
The Defendant was not present. However, he was represented by his counsel of record, LaMar J. 
Winward. The Court granted the Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate and proceeded to take evidence on 
the issue of jurisdiction and grounds to support the Petitioner's Complaint for divorce. 
Consistent with the evidence presented the Court hereby makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident of Washington County, Utah, was an 
actual and bona fide resident of Washington County, Utah, at the time these proceedings were 
1 
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commenced, and had been a resident of Washington County, Utah, for at least three months next 
prior to the commencement of these proceedings. 
2. The Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, having been married on March 27, 
1954, in Riverside, Bingham County, Idaho. 
3. During the parties' marriage there have developed differences between them which are 
irreconcilable. Those irreconcilable differences include the Defendant's infidelity and his use and 
abuse of alcohol. 
4. The parties separated in January of 1989 when the Plaintiff moved to Utah to further her 
education and not have lived together as husband and wife since that time. 
5. The parties have attempted to reconcile their differences by visiting each other during the 
time of their separation. Despite their efforts to reconcile, irreconcilable differences remain. The 
Plaintiff is therefore entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds of 
irreconcilable differences, the same to become final and effective immediately upon signature and 
entry. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties marriage by reason of the Plaintiffs residence 
in the State of Utah consistent with UCA §30-3-1 and, therefore, has the authority to grant a Decree 
of Divorce to the Plaintiff, severing the bonds of matrimony between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 
2. The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant on the grounds of 
2 
irreconcilable differences, the same to become final and effective immediately upon signature and 
entry. 
DATED this {<Q day of ^ LL .,1998. 
B^THE COURT: 
Jajrfes L. Shumate 
-'District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
LaMar J. Wirrovard 
Attorney for Defendant 
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